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CHAPTER 16
Two Concepts of Resistance: 
Foucault and Deleuze
DANIEL W. SMITH
In a letter Deleuze addressed to Foucault in 1977, shortly after the publication of 
the fi rst volume on The History of Sexuality (and which has since been published 
under the title “Desire and Pleasure”), Deleuze laid out several distinctions between 
his own philosophical trajectory and Foucault’s, one of which concerns, precisely, 
the status of Foucault’s concept of resistance. “It seems to me that Michel confronts 
a problem that does not have the same status for me,” Deleuze wrote.
If dispositifs of power are in some way constitutive [for Foucault], there can 
only be phenomena of “resistance” against them, and the question bears on 
the status of these phenomena . . . For myself, the status of phenomena of 
resistance is not a problem; since lines of fl ight are primary determinations, 
since [it is] desire [ – and not power – that] assembles the social fi eld . . . if 
the fi rst given of a society is that everything takes fl ight, then everything in it 
is deterritorialized.1
A Thousand Plateaus (which was published in 1981, four years after Deleuze penned 
his letter) contains a now well-known footnote where Deleuze and Guattari elabo-
rate these claims:
Our only points of disagreement with Foucault are the following: (1) to us 
the [social] assemblages seem fundamentally to be assemblages not of power, 
but of desire (desire is always assembled), and power seems to be a strati-
fi ed dimension of the assemblage; (2) the diagram and abstract machine 
have lines of fl ight that are primary, which are not phenomena of resis-
tance of counterattack in an assemblage, but cutting edges of creation and 
deterritorialization.2
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What I would like to do in this chapter is examine Deleuze’s critique of the concept 
of resistance. The point is not to choose one thinker over another, but to provide a 
kind of necessary conceptual analysis. If the task of philosophy is to create concepts, 
as Deleuze says; and if concepts divide up and distribute our world in different 
ways, then the differences in concepts can have certain ramifi cations – even if, as 
in the case of Deleuze and Foucault, they are dealing with similar problems. But in 
the end, I would, nonetheless, like to revive an aspect of Deleuze’s thought that has 
not been, unfortunately, one of his lingering legacies – even though, for a certain 
period of time, it is the aspect of his thought that was most well-known: namely, 
the theory of desire.
THE PLACE OF “RESISTANCE” IN FOUCAULT’S TRAJECTORY
The fi rst thing I would like to do is to follow the trajectory of Foucault’s thought to 
see why he was led to develop a concept of “resistance” in the fi rst place. Foucault’s 
thought is often divided into three periods, or three axes: (1) his early work on dis-
course and the conditions of knowledge (Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the 
Clinic, The Order of Things, The Archaeology of Knowledge); (2) a middle period, in 
the 1970s, on the mechanisms of power (Discipline and Punish, History of Sexuality, 
Volume 1); and (3) his fi nal work on ethics or modes of “subjectivation” (History of 
Sexuality, Volumes 2 and 3). The concept of resistance arises at a specifi c moment in 
this trajectory – at the end of the period on power – and there is a precise reason 
why Foucault was led to develop a concept of resistance at this point. Indeed, Fou-
cault was precipitated from one period to another by certain problems that arose in 
the domain he was then considering – they are, as it were, fault lines or cracks in his 
thought, sending it off in new and different directions.
Foucault’s fi rst period concerned, in part, the role of discourse in knowledge, 
and the relation of discursive formations to what Deleuze would call “fi elds of vis-
ibility.” We fi nd in Foucault’s work, for instance, an analysis of the discourse of 
madness or mental illness (in Madness and Civilization), which fi nds its “fi eld of 
visibility” (at a historically determinate moment) in the asylum, as a place where the 
mad are “made visible.” Similarly, we fi nd in Discipline and Punish an analysis of 
the discourse of delinquency and criminality, as well as an analysis of the prison as 
its fi eld of visibility. These two fi elds – the fi eld of discourse and the fi eld of visibil-
ity – are not the same, and have complex relations. The discourse of penal law, for 
instance, which defi nes which actions are criminal or illegal, is not the same as the 
discourse surrounding the prison, which deals with the question of how to manage 
the prisoners incarcerated there. Hence the fi rst problem (or set of problems) that 
arose in Foucault’s work: how, Foucault was asked, did he account for the relation 
between discourses and their corresponding fi elds of visibility – and even more 
to the point, how could he account for the discontinuity between historical epis-
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temes? (One of Foucault’s aims – notably in The Order of Things – was to show that 
“knowledge” has had various epistemic formations: from the Renaissance (sixteenth 
century) through the Classical Age (mid-seventeenth century through the end of 
the eighteenth century) to the Modern Age (nineteenth century through at least the 
mid-twentieth century).)
Foucault found an answer to these problems in the concept of power relations: 
every form of knowledge (as both a fi eld of discourse and a fi eld of visibility) is itself 
an integration of power relations, which Foucault defi ned as a capacity to affect and 
to be affected – or what he elsewhere termed “governmentality,” which precedes 
the formation of any given government. In his middle works, Foucault wound up 
isolating and analyzing two primary forms of governmentality: “disciplinary power” 
or “anatomo-politics,” which is exerted on individual bodies, and “bio-power,” 
which is exerted on large populations. Power relations themselves are never given 
or known – knowledge is still presented in terms of the two fi elds of discourse and 
visibility – but it is the exercise of power relations that makes knowledge possible, 
and it is their shifting relations that accounts for the discontinuities between forma-
tions of knowledge.
It was at the end of his considerations of the question of power that the problem 
of resistance arose – this is the second profound fault line in Foucault’s thought. If 
power is ubiquitous, if it covers the entire social fi eld, if it is these power relations 
that provoke and condition our forms of knowledge, then is it possible to alter these 
power relations themselves, to change them, to combat them – in short, to resist 
them? In a sense, this is the question that obsessed Foucault in his fi nal works, and 
that provoked his shift – which occurred between the fi rst and second volumes of 
the History of Sexuality – away from questions of power to questions of ethics and 
processes of subjectivation. 
This then, is our initial question: what exactly is the status of resistance in these 
later works of Foucault? It is true that Foucault will say that resistance is “primary” 
in relation to power relations, since it entails a relation with the outside.3 In this 
sense, one could perhaps speak of a progressive “deepening” in Foucault’s work as 
it develops: power relations condition the forms of knowledge, but resistance is 
primary in relation to power. Yet the idea that “resistance is primary in relation to 
power” is easier to say than to conceptualize, and no one was more aware of this 
than Foucault himself. The eight years that separate the fi rst two volumes of the 
History of Sexuality (1976–84) testify to this, and to the profundity of the problem 
that Foucault was grappling with. 
In his great essay “The Lives of Infamous Men,” Foucault had written that 
“the most intense point of a life, the point where its energy is concentrated, is 
where it comes up against power, struggles with it, attempts to use its forces and 
to evade its traps.”4 Indeed, the book for which this essay was intended to serve 
as an introduction was to be what Foucault called an “anthology of existences,” 
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that is, a documentation of the existence of people, in the past, whose lives would 
have disappeared into total obscurity had they not had a single run-in with the 
mechanisms of power, and left a tiny trace in an archive somewhere: petty crimi-
nals, inconsequential usurers, scandalous monks. For instance, in the archives of 
the hospital in Charenton, France, Foucault fi nds a short entry concerning one 
Mathurin Milan, admitted to the hospital on 31 August 1707, accused of madness. 
The entry reads:
His madness was always to hide from his family, to lead an obscure life in the 
country, to have actions at law, to lend usuriously and without security, to lead 
his feeble mind down unknown paths, and to believe himself capable of the 
greatest employments.5 
One can see why Foucault’s eye would have been attracted to this entry, which he 
found in the archives of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris (where Foucault spent 
a good percentage of his adult life). Mr. Milan seems to have led a not unordinary 
life: he lived alone and avoided his family, though he also engaged in suspicious 
money-lending and legal practices. Yet Mr. Milan was admitted to the Charenton 
hospital as “mad” for these very reasons – one of many obscure and “infamous” lives 
that was “reduced to ashes in the few sentences that struck them down.” Indeed, as 
Foucault comments, one of the questions provoked by reading Milan’s entry in the 
Charenton hospital archives concerned “the reason why people were so zealous to 
prevent the feebleminded from walking down unknown paths.”6 
“The Lives of Infamous Men” was published in January 1977, not long after 
the publication of the fi rst volume of the History of Sexuality, and the intended 
anthology was to have included the cases of Pierre Rivière (“having slaughtered my 
mother, my sister, and my brother . . .”) and Herculine Barbin (“being the recently 
discovered memoirs of a nineteenth-century French Hermaphrodite”). One can 
see how cases like those of Mathurin Milan pose the problem of resistance in an 
acute manner. As subjects, we are determined as much by forms of knowledge – 
for instance, by the categories and roles by which we are classifi ed and identifi ed 
(you are a man, or a woman, or a homosexual, or a teacher, or a student . . .) – as 
by the strategies of power that are constantly exerted upon us – ordering our time, 
distributing our space, making us develop our powers and capacities (such as our 
labor power) in determinate ways (such as the maximization of labor capacity in 
Fordism). How does someone like Milan resist these exercises of power? Foucault 
early on gave up on the idea that our “experience” had an independent existence 
prior to the exertion of power upon it. Power relations are ubiquitous, and are 
immanent to experience itself. The idea that power is imposed upon our experi-
ence from without is precisely the old conception of power that Foucault strove to 
contest throughout his writings. 
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It is thus from within the context of power relations that resistance must arise. 
But here is where we can see two conceptions of resistance in Foucault: a reactive 
and an active type of resistance (borrowing these terms from Deleuze’s reading of 
Nietzsche). The very concept seems to imply a reactive conception: resistance would 
seem to be defi ned as a reaction or as a response to a given exercise of power. We all 
know the paradigmatic case: the person in grade school who reacts to every com-
mand to sit down and sit up, to form a straight line, to stop talking in class, to raise 
your hand when you need to go to the toilet. Such a person resists power, every-
where and always, constantly testing its limits. And such a conception is repeated 
on a larger scale, socially and politically. As a mere reaction to power, however, resis-
tance is quickly reappropriated and restratifi ed, and the “knots of power” quickly 
reform around it.7 Foucault’s question then became: what is an active conception of 
resistance (which is simply another way of answering the question of how resistance 
is primary in relation to power)? 
The answer to this question came in Foucault’s fi nal works: power becomes 
active when it is directed, not against another exercise of power, but against itself. 
Resistance becomes active in the relation to oneself, the ability each of us has to 
affect oneself, the affect of the self by itself. In affecting myself, I open up the pos-
sibility of creating myself in a way that differs from the present forms of knowledge, 
and the present constraints of power. In reading Foucault’s biographies, and his last 
interviews, it seems clear that this active conception of resistance was developed, or 
at least confi rmed, by Foucault’s experiences in California, where he went to teach 
at Berkeley. In San Francisco, he discovered a gay community that had little parallel 
in Paris, and which had been created, not by a wholesale frontal reaction against 
a homophobic culture, but rather step by step, on the basis of individuals exerting 
power on themselves, affecting themselves, constituting themselves as gay, and then 
linking up, slowly but surely, into a group or community that, by the time Foucault 
arrived, had a signifi cant political presence and political power. In this sense, Fou-
cault’s philosophy recapitulated the three questions of Kant’s philosophy: (1) What 
can I know? (What can I see and articulate within any given historical episteme?); (2) 
What can I do? (What power may I claim and what resistances may I counter?); and 
most importantly (3) What can I be? (How can I produce myself as a subject? How 
can I be otherwise? How can I ‘think otherwise’?) The answer to the latter question 
is given, in part, by the capacity of power or force to affect itself. 
FROM FOUCAULT TO DELEUZE
The ambiguities of Foucault’s position here, however, have often been noted. Most 
often, Foucault’s later turn toward ethics, or modes of subjectivation (ways I can 
affect myself, ways I can produce myself as a subject) has been interpreted in merely 
aesthetic and private terms: I can treat myself or my life as a work of art, something to 
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be fashioned creatively, but that creation is ultimately a kind of private endeavor, far 
removed from political realities. This is how Richard Rorty tended to read Foucault’s 
later work, though the example of the gay community in San Francisco shows that 
“affecting oneself” is far more than an aesthetic enterprise. More importantly, Fou-
cault’s work on ethics or “modes of subjectivation” touches on a profound point that 
allows us to link up Foucault’s work with Deleuze’s. In The Use of Pleasure, Foucault 
says that the affect of the self by itself presumes a determination of an “ethical sub-
stance” that is to be affected – whether it is pleasure, desire, the fl esh, one’s feelings, 
and so forth. He summarized the ethical conduct of various periods in some familiar 
slogans. For the Greeks, it was “Know yourself!” following the Socratic dictum. For 
the Romans, it was “Master yourself!” where the ethical substance to be affected was 
the passions, which needed to be mastered and harmonized. For the Christians, it 
was “Deny yourself!” and what needed to be denied were the cravings of the fl esh, 
and their concupiscence. For us moderns, the slogan has become “Express yourself!”, 
that is, express the feelings and desire that constitute you – that constitute what you 
really are. Foucault’s whole conception of ethics implies a determination of the ethi-
cal substance that is to be affected. 
In his book on Foucault, Deleuze himself poses a question that, in retrospect, 
has an enormous resonance. “Is the affect of self by self pleasure,” he asks, “or 
desire?”8 This question refers to a minor dispute between Foucault and Deleuze 
that nonetheless has important implications for the question at hand, namely, the 
status of “resistance” in the two thinkers. In Deleuze’s 1977 open letter to Foucault, 
“Desire and Pleasure,” with which we began, Deleuze recounts that Foucault once 
said to him:
I cannot bear the word desire; even if you use it differently, I cannot keep myself 
from thinking or living that desire = lack, or that desire is repressed. Michel 
added, whereas myself, what I call pleasure is perhaps what you call desire; but 
in any case, I need another word than desire.
Obviously, once again, this is more than a question of words. Because for my 
part, I can scarcely tolerate the word pleasure. But why? For me, desire implies no 
lack; neither is it a natural given. It is an agencement [assemblage] of heterogeneous 
elements that function . . . I cannot give any positive value to pleasure because 
pleasure seems to me to interrupt the immanent process of desire; pleasure seems 
to me to be on the side of strata and organization . . . Pleasure seems to me to 
be the only means for a person or a subject to “fi nd itself again” in a process that 
surpasses it.9 
These comments seem to reveal that, at the end of his career, in the midst of his 
refl ections on resistance, Foucault was led to a point that suddenly seemed to fi nd 
itself linked up, in complicated and sometimes obscure ways, with Deleuze’s earlier 
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work on desire. Deleuze seemed to have a premonition of these linkages: “Could 
I think of equivalences of this type,” he asked himself, “what for me is the body 
without organs corresponds to what for Michel is body-pleasures? Can I relate 
the ‘body–fl esh’ distinction, of which Michel spoke to me, to the ‘body without 
organs–organization distinction?”10 Yet although Deleuze raises these questions, he 
admits that he does not know how to answer them. “I do not know how to situate 
myself,” he confesses, “in relation to Michel’s present research.”11
If Deleuze was unable to situate his own work in relation to Foucault in 1977, the 
intervening years have perhaps given us a more perspicacious perspective. Why does 
the concept of resistance, which arises in Foucault’s work for determinable reasons, 
fi nd no precise equivalent in Deleuze? Why does Deleuze appeal to a concept of desire 
rather than power/resistance (or even pleasure)? To attempt to answer these questions, 
we must look at Anti-Oedipus, which Deleuze co-authored with Félix Guattari and 
published in 1972. Anti-Oedipus, I would argue, goes back to two fundamental think-
ers as its precursors. On the manifest surface, these two thinkers would seem to be 
Freud and Marx. Both Freud and Marx insisted, in their own ways, that our conscious 
thought is determined by forces that go beyond consciousness – forces that are, as 
we say, “unconscious” (though we are far too used to this word; it would be better to 
formulate a new one). Put crudely, in Marx, our thought is determined by our class 
(“class consciousness”); in Freud, we are determined by our unconscious desires (stem-
ming, usually, from familial confl icts). The nature of the relationship between these 
two unconsciousnesses – the “political economy” of Marx and the “libidinal econ-
omy” of Freud – was a question that numerous thinkers tried to answer. For a long 
time, the relation between the two economies had been formulated in terms of the 
mechanisms of “introjection” and “projection”: as an individual, I introject the inter-
ests of my class, my culture, my social milieu, which eventually come to determine 
my consciousness (my “false” consciousness); at the same time, the political economy 
was seen as a projection of the individual desires of the population that produced it. 
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari famously reject these mechanisms: they argue 
that political economy (Marx) and libidinal economy (Freud) are one and the same 
thing. We have perhaps heard this thesis too many times to comprehend its truly 
revolutionary nature, and this is perhaps because the two fundamental precursors of 
Anti-Oedipus are not Freud and Marx, despite appearances, but rather Nietzsche and 
Kant. Understanding their role as precursors will help us see more clearly the relation 
between Foucault and Deleuze on the question of resistance.
NIETZSCHE ON LIBIDINAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
Let me turn fi rst to Nietzsche. There are two aspects of his thought that are 
relevant here: his theory of the drives (a libidinal economy), and his theory con-
cerning the genealogy of morality (a political economy). As an example of what 
271
TWO CONCEPTS OF RESISTANCE
Nietzsche means by a drive, consider this brief discussion of the drives from 
Nietzsche’s early book, Daybreak: 
Suppose we were in the market place one day and we noticed someone laugh-
ing at us as we went by: this event will signify this or that to us according to 
whether this or that drive happens at that moment to be at its height in us – 
and it will be a quite different event according to the kind of person we are. 
One person will absorb it like a drop of rain, another will shake it from him 
like an insect, another will try to pick a quarrel, another will examine his cloth-
ing to see if there is anything about it that might give rise to laughter, another 
will be led to refl ect on the nature of laughter as such, another will be glad to 
have involuntarily augmented the amount of cheerfulness and sunshine in the 
world – and in each case, a drive has gratifi ed itself, whether it be the drive to 
annoyance, or to combativeness or to refl ection or to benevolence. This drive 
seized the event as its prey. Why precisely this one? Because, thirsty and hungry, 
it was lying in wait.12 
This is the source of Nietzsche’s doctrine of perspectivism (“there are no facts, only 
interpretations”), but what is often overlooked is that, for Nietzsche, it is our drives 
that interpret the world, that are perspectival – and not our egos or our conscious 
opinions. All of us, as individuals, contain within ourselves such a vast confusion 
of confl icting drives that we are, as Nietzsche liked to say, multiplicities, and not 
unities. It is not so much that I have a different perspective on the world than you; 
it is rather that each of us has multiple perspectives on the world because of the 
multiplicity of our drives – drives that are often contradictory among themselves. 
Within ourselves, Nietzsche insists, we can at the same time be egoistic or altruistic, 
hard-hearted or magnanimous, just or unfair, can cause pain or give pleasure. More-
over, our drives are in a constant struggle or combat with each other: my drive to 
smoke and get my nicotine rush is in combat with (but also coexistent with) my 
drive to quit. This is also where Nietzsche fi rst developed his concept of the will to 
power – at the level of the drives. “Every drive is a kind of lust to rule,” he writes, 
“each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to 
accept as a norm.”13
We can try to combat the drives, of course, and struggle against them – indeed, 
this is one of the most common themes in philosophy: the fi ght against the pas-
sions. In another passage from Daybreak, Nietzsche says that he can see only 
about six fundamental methods we have at our disposal for combating a drive. For 
instance, we can avoid opportunities for its gratifi cation (no longer hiding packs 
of cigarettes at home); or we can implant regularity into the drive (having one 
cigarette every four hours so as to at least avoid smoking in between); or we can 
engender disgust with the drive, giving ourselves over to its wild and unrestrained 
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gratifi cation (smoking non-stop for a week) to the point where we become disgusted 
with it. But then Nietzsche asks: who exactly is combating the drives in these various 
ways? His answer: 
[The fact] that one desires to combat the vehemence of a drive at all, however, does 
not stand within our own power; nor does the choice of any particular method; 
nor does the success or failure of this method. What is clearly the case is that in 
this entire procedure our intellect is only the blind instrument of another drive 
which is a rival of the drive whose vehemence is tormenting us . . . While “we” 
believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is one 
drive which is complaining about the other; that is to say: for us to become aware 
that we are suffering from the vehemence [or violence] of a drive presupposes the 
existence of another equally vehement or even more vehement drive, and that a 
struggle is in prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides.14 
Instinctively, Nietzsche says, we take our predominant drive and for the moment turn 
it into the whole ego, placing all our weaker drives perspectivally farther away, as if 
those other drives weren’t me but rather an it (this is the origin of Freud’s idea of the 
id, which simply means the “it”). When smokers continually say they are trying to 
stop smoking, it simply means that their conscious intellect is taking sides with a 
particular drive: the drive to quit, rather than the drive to light up, which nonethe-
less remains stronger than the former. When we talk about the “I,” we are simply 
indicating which drive, at the moment, is strongest and sovereign: the feeling of the 
“I” is the strongest wherever the preponderance lies, even though it can fl icker from 
drive to drive. What we call thinking, willing, and feeling are all “merely a relation of 
the drives to each other.”15 But the drives remain largely unknown to the conscious 
intellect. Nietzsche concludes:
However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing can be more incom-
plete than his image of the totality of drives which constitute his being. He can 
scarcely name the cruder ones: their number and strength, their ebb and fl ood, 
their play and counterplay among one another – and above all the laws of their 
nutriment – remain unknown to him.16
In other words, there is no struggle of reason against the drives; what we call 
“reason” is nothing more than a certain “system of relations between various pas-
sions,” a certain ordering of the drives.17 In the Gay Science, Nietzsche considers 
the familiar example we have of becoming more reasonable as we grow older. 
“Something that you formerly loved as a truth or probability strikes you as an 
error,” Nietzsche surmises, so you cast it off “and fancy that it represents a victory 
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for your reason.” But it is less a victory for reason than a shift in the relations 
among the drives. He continues:
Perhaps this error was as necessary for you then, when you were a different per-
son – you are always a different person – as are all your present “truths” . . . What 
killed that opinion for you was your new life [that is, a new drive] and not your 
reason: you no longer need it, and now it collapses and unreason crawls out of it 
into the light like a worm. When we criticize something, this is no arbitrary and 
impersonal event; it is, at least very often, evidence of vital energies in us that are 
growing and shedding a skin. We negate and must negate because something in us 
wants to live and affi rm – something that we perhaps do not know or see as yet.18 
Nietzsche’s entire critique of traditional metaphysics – his critique of logic, of the 
categories, of the ego, of religion – is undertaken from the perspective of the libidinal 
economy of drives. 
But this is where the question of morality (political economy) comes in for 
Nietzsche. Drives differ from instincts – instincts are predetermined (hawks fl y, 
lions hunt, beavers build dams), whereas drives are not. Humans, says Nietzsche, 
are undifferentiated animals. Since the drives are not completely determined, one 
of the functions of morality is to establish an “order of rank” among the drives or 
impulses. “Wherever we encounter a morality, we also encounter valuations and an 
order of rank of human impulses . . . Now one and now another human impulse 
and state held fi rst place and was ennobled because it was esteemed so highly.”19 
Consider any list of impulses – they are almost immediately categorized as virtues 
and vices: industriousness is a virtue, sloth is a vice; obedience is a virtue, defi -
ance and insubordination are vices; chastity is virtuous, promiscuity a vice; these 
days, not smoking is a virtue, smoking is a vice. When Nietzsche inquires into the 
genealogy of morality, he is inquiring into the conditions of any particular moral 
ranking of the impulses: why certain impulses are selected for and certain impulses 
are selected against. 
Nietzsche argues that the value inherent in most moral rankings is what he 
calls the “herd instinct.” The drives that were selected for were those that served 
the needs of the community, the furtherance of the “species’: impulses that were 
“unegoistic,” drives toward self-abnegation, self-sacrifi ce, etc. Selfl essness is a virtue, 
selfi shness a vice. More generally, Nietzsche would argue that herd morality is an 
instinct against Life. But there is no distinction between nature and artifi ce here: it 
is not as if we could simply remove the mechanisms of morality and culture and 
allow the drives to exist in a “free” and “unbound” state. There is no “natural” or 
“spontaneous” state of the drives, except as an Idea. The impulse toward the herd, 
toward the community, is itself a drive, in competition with the other drives: we 
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never leave the domain of the drives. Kant liked to say that we can never get beyond 
our representations; Nietzsche surmises that what we can never get beyond is the 
reality of the drives.20 But in fact, the drives and impulses are always assembled or 
arranged in different ways, in different individuals, in different cultures, in differ-
ent eras, in different moralities – which is why Nietzsche always insisted that there 
is a plurality of moralities, and what he found lacking in his time was an adequate 
comparative study of moralities.
Now Deleuze, it seems to me, takes up this Nietzschean schema, mutatis mutan-
dis. On the one hand, what he calls “desire” is nothing other than the state of the 
impulses and drives: “Drives are simply the desiring-machines themselves.”21 On the 
other hand, like Nietzsche, Deleuze insists that the drives never exist in a free and 
unbound state, nor are they ever merely individual; they are always arranged and 
assembled, not only by moral systems, but more generally by every social formation. 
The social formations analyzed in Capitalism and Schizophrenia – “primitives,” States, 
capitalism, war machines – are a typology of different ways in which the drives and 
affects can be assembled. Deleuze and Guattari note that the schema of Anti-Oedipus 
was partly inspired by Pierre Klossowski’s books Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle and 
Living Currency. “In his recent works, Klossowski indicates to us the only means of 
bypassing the sterile parallelism where we fl ounder between Freud and Marx by dis-
covering . . . how affects or drives form part of the infrastructure itself.”22 Although the 
claim that there is no difference in nature between libidinal and political economy 
has complex practical consequences, it is fairly straightforward theoretically, and two 
distinctions may help clarify Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis.
The fi rst is the distinction between desire and interest. A well-known school of 
economics sees human beings as rational agents who seek to maximize their interest. 
Someone who wants to become a professor, for instance, could pursue that interest by 
applying to a university, taking courses, writing a thesis and attending conferences, in 
the hope of ultimately securing an academic position. Such an interest can be pursued 
in a highly rational manner. But that interest, and the means to pursue it, only exists 
within the context of a particular social formation. If someone decides to pursue that 
interest in a concerted and rational manner, it is because their desire – their drives 
and affects – is already invested in the social formation that makes that interest pos-
sible. For this reason, Deleuze insists that desire is always positive. Normally, we tend 
to think of desire in terms of lack: if we desire something, it is because we lack it. But 
Deleuze reconfi gures the concept of desire: what we desire – what our drives and 
affects are invested in – is a social formation. Lack appears only at the level of inter-
est, and in multiple ways: one may have an interest in obtaining an academic posi-
tion one does not have (a fi rst lack), only to discover that a competitive job market 
makes it impossible to obtain that position (a second lack). Marketing and advertis-
ing are aimed at the manipulation of interest: I reach for a favored brand of toothpaste 
because I have now an interest in white teeth and fresh breath. This is why Deleuze 
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and Guattari argue that the fundamental problem of political philosophy is one that 
was formulated most clearly by Spinoza: “Why do people fi ght for their servitude as 
stubbornly as though it were their salvation?”23 The answer: because your desire is 
never your own. Desire is not a psychic reality, nor is it strictly individual; rather, your 
drives and affects are from the start part of the social infrastructure. 
The distinction between interest and desire, in turn, parallels the distinction 
between the rational and the irrational, though Deleuze rarely uses these terms. 
“Once interests have been defi ned within the confi nes of a society, what is rational 
is the way in which people pursue those interests and attempt to realize them,” such 
as the interest for a job or white teeth. “But underneath that,” Deleuze explains:
you fi nd desires, investments of desire that are not to be confused with invest-
ments of interest, and on which interests depend for their determination and 
very distribution: an enormous fl ow, all kinds of libidinal-unconscious fl ows 
that constitute the delirium of the society.24 
Every society is thus a distribution of the rational and the irrational, but the rational 
is always the rationality of something irrational: 
Reason is always a region carved out of the irrational. It is not sheltered from 
the rational, but is a region traversed by the irrational and is simply defi ned 
by a certain relationship between irrational factors. Beneath all reason there is 
delirium and drift. Everything about capitalism is rational, except capital . . . A 
stock market is a perfectly rational mechanism, you can understand it and learn 
how it works; capitalists certainly know how to use it; yet it’s completely deliri-
ous, it’s crazy . . . It’s just like theology: everything about it is perfectly rational if 
you accept sin, the immaculate conception, and the incarnation . . .25
DELEUZE’S INVERSION OF KANT’S THEORY OF DESIRE
Why then do Deleuze and Guattari present Anti-Oedipus as a theory of desire rather 
than a theory of drives? Here again, on the manifest surface, the obvious response 
is that Anti-Oedipus constitutes a critique of psychoanalysis, and thus is necessar-
ily indexed on the theory of “unconscious” desire found in both Freud and Lacan. 
At a certain level, Anti-Oedipus presents itself as a theory of the “real,” in Laca-
nian terms, but the real is analyzed in purely positive terms, and not as a lack, an 
impossibility, or a gap in the symbolic, as in Lacan.26 It is no doubt not by chance 
that, after the appearance of Anti-Oedipus, Lacan’s own work turned increasingly 
toward the theory of the drives.27 Yet in the end, the theory of desire found in Anti-
Oedipus is indexed less on Freud or Lacan than on Kant, and particularly Kant’s 
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second critique, the Critique of Practical Reason. One might surmise (correctly) that 
Deleuze has little sympathy with the second critique, with its appeal to a transcen-
dent moral law and the categorical imperative (which Deleuze will replace with 
immanence and a “problematic” imperative). But if Deleuze and Guattari explicitly 
model Anti-Oedipus on the Critique of Pure Reason, it is because Kant presents the 
second critique in its entirety as a theory of desire. We must therefore analyze the 
way in which Deleuze and Guattari take up and modify Kant’s concept of desire in 
Anti-Oedipus.
Kant argued that there are three fundamental faculties of the mind: the faculty 
of knowledge, the faculty of desire, and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (third 
critique).28 These defi nitions are derived from the nature of our representations: 
every representation we have can be related to something other than itself – that 
is, both to an object and to the subject. In the faculty of knowledge (fi rst critique), 
a representation is related to an object, from the viewpoint of its agreement or con-
formity with it (theory of reference, or denotation). In the faculty of the feeling of 
pleasure and pain (third critique), the representation is related to the subject, insofar 
as the representation affects the subject by intensifying or weakening its vital force 
(Deleuze will develop this idea in his concepts of affectivity and intensity). Finally, 
in the faculty of desire (second critique), the representation is likewise related to an 
object, but in this case it enters into a causal relationship with its object. Kant’s defi -
nition of the faculty of desire is extraordinary: it is “a faculty which by means of its 
representations is the cause of the actuality of the objects of those representations.”29 
On the surface, the defi nition sounds like magic: if I have a representation in my 
mind, the faculty of desire is capable of producing the object that corresponds to it. 
Readers of Kant, however, know why he defi nes the faculty of desire in causal 
terms: the problem of freedom concerns the operation by which a free being can be 
said to be the cause of an action. I have a representation in my mind of the killing 
of my enemy, and the faculty of desire carries out that action in the world. In acting 
freely, the agent produces something that is not reducible to the causal determinism 
of mechanism. “Practical reason,” Kant writes, “does not have to do with objects 
for the sake of knowing them but with its own ability to make them real.”30 Kant 
was aware, of course, that real objects can be produced only by an external causality 
and external mechanisms; yet this knowledge does not prevent us from believing in 
the intrinsic power of desire to create its own object, if only in an unreal, hallucina-
tory, or delirious form. In what Kant calls the “pathological” productions of desire, 
what is produced by desire is merely a psychic reality.31 Nonetheless, Kant brought 
about a Copernican Revolution in practical philosophy to which Deleuze is strongly 
indebted, and explicitly so: desire is no longer defi ned in terms of lack (I desire 
something because I do not have it), but rather in terms of production (I produce 
the object because I desire it). The fundamental thesis of Anti-Oedipus is a stronger 
variant of Kant’s claim. “If desire produces,” Deleuze and Guattari write, “its product 
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is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can 
produce only reality.”32 How does Deleuze come to justify this extraordinary claim, 
which seems even more extraordinary than Kant’s? 
For Kant, the essential question concerns the higher form that each faculty is 
capable of (a form which is no longer merely “pathological”). A faculty has a higher 
form when it fi nds within itself the law of its own exercise, and thus is said to function 
autonomously. The higher form of desire, for Kant, is what he calls the “will.” The will 
is the same thing as desire, but raised to its higher form. Desire becomes will when it 
is determined by the representation of a pure form – namely, the moral law, which is 
the pure form of a universal legislation (the categorical imperative). Practical reason 
“has to do with a will which is a causality inasmuch as reason contains its determining 
ground.”33 For Kant, it is only under such conditions that we can be said to be acting 
freely. For Deleuze, however, it is signifi cant that, in Kant, the moral law requires the 
intervention of the three great transcendent Ideas as its postulates. “Freedom,” as the 
“fact” of morality, implies the cosmological Idea of a supra-sensible world, indepen-
dent of any sensible condition. In turn, the abyss that separates the noumenal Law 
and the phenomenal world requires the intermediary of an intelligible author of sen-
sible Nature or a “moral cause of the world,” that is, the theological Idea of a supreme 
being, or God. This abyss, fi nally, can only be bridged through the “postulate” of 
an infi nite progress, which requires the psychological Idea of the immortality of the 
soul. In other words, having denounced the transcendent Ideas of Soul, World, and 
God in the fi rst Critique, Kant resurrects each of them, one by one, in the second 
Critique, and gives them a practical determination. 
Deleuze, of course, rejects this appeal to transcendence on Kant’s part, and in 
effect he asks: would it be possible to develop a theory of desire that did not appeal 
to the moral law and the transcendent Ideas that serve as its postulate (which turn 
desire into a “will”), but instead synthesized desire with a conception of Ideas that 
are purely immanent? This is precisely what takes place in the opening two chap-
ters of Anti-Oedipus: the three syntheses by which Deleuze and Guattari defi ne 
“desiring-machines” (conjunction, connection, disjunction) are in fact the three 
same Ideas that Kant defi nes as the postulates of practical reason – Self, World, and 
God – but now stripped entirely of their transcendent status, to the point where 
neither God, World, nor Self subsists. Anti-Oedipus is thus an attempt to rewrite the 
transcendent theory of desire developed in the Critique of Practical Reason from a 
purely immanent viewpoint. But what does it mean to speak of a purely immanent 
theory of desire?
In Kant, God is the master of the disjunctive syllogism: he creates the world by 
parceling out predicates according to the either/or disjunction: you can be man or 
woman, black or white, but not both. Deleuze turns this into a diabolical “disjunc-
tive synthesis,” in which both sides of every disjunctive are affi rmed at once: man 
and woman, black and white. In Kant, the Idea of the World is derived from the 
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hypothetical syllogism “if . . . then,” a causal chain which, when extended to infi n-
ity, gives the Idea of the World, the Universe, the totality of all that is. Deleuze turns 
this into a connective synthesis, an “and . . . and” that is open-ended, rhizomatic, 
never totalizable, and produces a chaosmos rather than a World. In Kant, fi nally, the 
Self is derived from the categorical syllogism, a substance that lies behind all our 
representations. Deleuze turns this into an immanent conjunctive synthesis, which 
produces a kind of counter-self, a schizophrenic self, defi ned merely by a series of 
intensive states. In sum: “The Grand Canyon of the world, the ‘crack’ of the self, 
and the dismembering of God.”34 Deleuze gives a purely immanent characterization 
of the three syntheses that Kant defi nes in transcendent terms: connection (the dis-
solution of the Self ), conjunction (the destruction of the World), and disjunction 
(the death of God). Desire (the relations between the drives and affects) is con-
stituted by tracing out series and trajectories following these immanent syntheses 
within a given social assemblage. Anti-Oedipus is the Critique of Practical Reason 
turned on its head: an immanent theory of desire that refuses to synthesize desire 
with the transcendent Ideas that would turn it into the “will” (in the Kantian sense).
FROM RESISTANCE TO CAPTURE
Anti-Oedipus, then, is a kind of amalgam of Nietzsche and Kant: Kant’s theory of 
desire rendered immanent under a Nietzschean inspiration. Deleuze does not fl ag 
these links; indeed, Deleuze was so imbued with the history of philosophy that 
he naturally seemed to be following the thought of the great philosophers, always 
pushing them to their differential and immanent limit, freeing them from the great 
terminal points of traditional metaphysics, God, the World, and the Self. But this 
sketch of Deleuze’s theory of desire is enough to make clear why the question of 
resistance does not arise in Deleuze’s philosophy. If resistance becomes a question 
in Foucault, it is because he begins with the question of knowledge (what is articu-
lable and what is visible), fi nds the conditions of knowledge in power, but then has 
to ask about the ways one can resist power, even if resistance is primary in relation 
to power. It is Foucault’s starting point in constituted knowledges that leads him 
to pose the problem of resistance. One fi nds a comparable trajectory, to a certain 
extent, in Lacan, or at least certain Lacanians: if one begins with the Symbolic, one 
is led to seek the gaps or ruptures in the Symbolic that are produced by the Real. 
One could say that the status of the Real in Lacan is analogous to the status of 
resistance in Lacan. 
Deleuze’s ontology, by contrast, operates in an almost exactly inverse manner. 
Put crudely, if one begins with a status quo – knowledge or the symbolic – one must 
look for a break or rupture in the status quo to account for change. Deleuze instead 
begins with change, with becoming, with events. For Deleuze, what is primary in 
any social formation are its lines of fl ight, its movements of deterritorialization, 
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which are already movements of resistance. “Far from lying outside the social fi eld or 
emerging from it,” Deleuze writes, “lines of fl ight constitute its rhizome or cartog-
raphy.”35 Resistance, in a sense, is built into Deleuze’s ontology, and for this reason, 
the conceptual problem he faces wound up being quite different from Foucault’s. 
If a social fi eld “fl ees” or “leaks” in every direction, the primary question is how 
any social formation manages to capture these movements, to integrate, to stratify 
them – and it is precisely “organizations of power” that effect this integration and 
capture. This explains the statement in Deleuze’s 1977 letter with which we began: 
“If dispositifs of power are in some way constitutive [for Foucault], there can only be 
phenomena of ‘resistance’ against them . . . For myself, the status of phenomena of 
resistance is not a problem, since lines of fl ight are primary determinations.”36 This 
claim reaches its culmination in the analysis of capitalism found in Anti-Oedipus: 
capitalism is a vast enterprise of deterritorialization and decoding, pushed to an 
almost schizophrenic limit, which nonetheless reterritorializes and recodes with one 
hand what it decodes and deterritorializes on the other. 
But this leads to a fi nal problem. If resistance is not a conceptual problem in 
Deleuze, it is because it is, in effect, built into his ontology. But a different problem 
comes to the fore in Deleuze, which gets at the same issue Foucault was confront-
ing with the problem of resistance, but from an inverted position. It is a problem 
that remained unaddressed in Anti-Oedipus, and would only receive a solution in A 
Thousand Plateaus, and it is precisely the problem of the organization of power. “Our 
problem is as follows,” Deleuze said in a 1973 interview, shortly after the publica-
tion of Anti-Oedipus:
Given a system [capitalism] that escapes in every direction and that, at the same 
time, continually prevents, represses, or blocks escape routes by every available 
means, what can we do so that the escapes may no longer be individual attempts 
or small communities, but instead truly constitute a revolutionary machine?37
In other words, it is our own desire that organizes power and its system of repres-
sion, such that we all invest our desire in the very social machine that represses us 
and defi nes our interests. But this forces upon Deleuze a manner of posing the 
problem of resistance in a new way: can desire organize power in such a way that the 
social machine it constitutes is truly a revolutionary machine? “The real problems,” 
as Guattari says, “are problems of organization.”38
It is precisely this issue that Deleuze and Guattari address in the “Treatise on 
Nomadology” in A Thousand Plateaus with their concept of the “war-machine.” It is, 
in my opinion, one of the most original and important texts in Deleuze’s corpus, and 
lies at the core of his political philosophy. Why have revolutions gone badly? Because, 
until now, there has not existed within the revolutionary fi eld a social machine that 
did not produce an embryonic State apparatus, or a party apparatus, which is the very 
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institution of repression. Until now, revolutionary parties have constituted themselves 
as synthesizers of interests, rather than functioning as analyzers of desires. The ques-
tion of revolution must be pushed to the level of desire: if it is desire that organizes 
power, is desire capable of organizing a social machine that does not reproduce a State 
apparatus? It is not enough simply to say that escape, resistance, and deterritorializa-
tion are primary in any social system. What is necessary is an organization of power 
that is capable of organizing and uniting these modes of escape without reproducing 
a State apparatus. This is why, for Deleuze, it is the concept of the war-machine that 
poses the true problem of revolution: “How can a war machine account for all the 
escapes that happen in the present system without crushing them, dismantling them, 
and without reproducing a state apparatus?”39
In this sense, the war machine is a social assemblage that is constructed directly 
on a line of fl ight: it is itself a movement of decoding, of deterritorialization – 
which is why it tends to disappear and abolish itself, or be appropriated by the 
State. Indeed, it seems likely to me that Deleuze and Guattari were attempting 
to identify the kind of social formation that would correspond to the mode of 
existence of “activity” and “affi rmation,” in the Nietzschean sense.40 If the State is 
a reactive formation, the nomadic war-machine must be seen as an active forma-
tion, one that follows the movement of a line of fl ight. It is here that the problem 
of resistance appears in Deleuze’s work at its most acute point: the analysis of the 
war-machine as a collective organization of power. The true confrontation con-
cerns the relation between Foucault’s problem of resistance and Deleuze’s problem 
of capture.
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